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CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATION: WITHOUT
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TAMAR FRANKEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Securitization is uniquely suited to cross national borders.  This
form of financial intermediation consists of several discrete stages de-
signed and executed in different countries, and then linked to form a
desired intermediation scheme.1  While international transactions are
usually designed and completed in one country the parts of cross-
border securitization are designed and completed in more than one
country.2
The law of cross-border securitization poses two intriguing puz-
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Professors Wendy Gordon, Maureen O'Rourke and William Park for their insightful com-
ments.  Many thanks to my assistants Dan Pierce, 3L, and William Hecker, Esq. for their in-
valuable help in research and editing the Article and to Mr. Ken Westhassel for his superb sec-
retarial help.
1. These stages include making or acquiring debt obligations, assigning these obligations
to a specially signed entity, causing the entity to issue to investors securities representing claims
against the asset of the entity, securing credit enhancement, seeking ratings for the entity’s se-
curities, creating secondary markets for the securities and managing and servicing the assets
held by the entity.  See TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION §2.5.1, at 41-42 (1991); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135-36 (1994).
2. See Emil Arca, Cross-Border Securitisation, REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES, Feb. 14,
1996, at 21 (defining cross-border  securitization transactions as those in which: (i) the company
originating the asset is in one country; (ii) a trust or other special purpose entity in another
country purchases the originator’s receivables; (iii) the payors on the receivables are outside
the originator’s country; (iv) the receivables are largely denominated in the currency of the se-
curities; (v) the trust receives payments directly from the payors and makes distributions  di-
rectly to investors), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. On the history of the in-
ternational markets in mortgage backed securities, see Henry A. Fernandez, Globalization of
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357; JOHN K. THOMPSON, SECU-
RITIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
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zles.3  First, actors in cross-border securitization seem to work at cross
purposes: they compete by creating unique innovative structures,
contracts, and country combinations, but then seem to undermine
their competitive advantages by cooperating to convert their crea-
tions into standard and uniform rules.  Why don’t financial and legal
innovators protect their creations by trademarks, copyrights and pat-
ents, and charge users through licensing?  How can these innovators
reap any rewards for their efforts?
Part II of the Article addresses this puzzle.  It starts by intro-
ducing cross-border securitization.  The process is defined and analo-
gized to the trust-concept in the Anglo-American legal systems,
highlighting the way both institutions facilitate market transactions.
Part II of the Article also discusses the cross-border aspect of securi-
tization, comparing it with the development of multinational corpora-
tions, and examining the conditions and incentives that drive them to
“cross-borders.”  The discussion explains what motivates innovators
of securitization law to establish their creations as industry standards,
and how they benefit by “giving away” their innovations.
A second puzzle posed by cross-border securitization relates to
the nature of the law that governs it.  By definition, cross-border se-
curitization is not governed by one or even two legal systems.4  The
choice of a jurisdiction may depend on how receptive and accommo-
dating a particular jurisdiction is to securitization.
Theoretically, cross-border securitization can take place without
a governing country law, or under a very lax, fully enabling, country
law.  Yet, market and institutional intermediation are unlikely to
arise, let alone flourish, without a legal infrastructure that provides
uniform, predictable, stable rules of behavior.5  Securitization in-
volves both institutional and market intermediation.  The process re-
3. Laws affecting the process include borrowers’ and creditors’ rights, bankruptcy, regu-
lation of financial institutions, and taxation of the entity, the intermediaries involved and the
investors. Cross-border securitization may also involve issues that relate to all international
transactions such as jurisdiction, choice of law, extraterritorial application of foreign laws, trea-
ties, sovereign immunity and act of state doctrine. See Merritt B. Fox, The Legal Environment
of International Finance: Thinking About Fundamentals, 17 MICH. J.  INT’L L. 721, 729-30
(1996) (book review).
4. See id. at 729 (“The distinctive feature about the rules that govern the behavior of par-
ties to cross border financial transactions is the absence of a single, unitary legal system.”).
5. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-
proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1673, 1677 (1996)
(emphasizing the need of business actors for established norms and their tendency to cooper-
ate); Tamar Frankel, Essay, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and
Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389 (1993).
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quires a legally binding assignment of financial assets to a bank-
ruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle, a developed securities market
and a regulatory system to support it, as well as regulated intermedi-
aries that inspire investor confidence.  Predictable laws are especially
important in securitization because the process involves several inde-
pendent parties.
Part III explains how cross-border securitization arose in the
first place without a uniform governing law and why it is spreading
quickly to so many countries, including those without the necessary
financial and legal infrastructures.  This explanation is based on the
nature of securitization and on the theory of decentralized lawmak-
ing.  Because securitization is an intermediation system combining
different components, linked together through markets, actors can
pick and choose legal systems in the global “market for laws.”  In ad-
dition, parties can contract to supplement inadequate country laws.
These private laws are then repeated and accepted as customs—a
modern “law merchant,”6 which, in turn are absorbed into model con-
tracts and rules of trade and professional associations, international
ad hoc and standing committees, and domestic laws that facilitate the
securitization process.  This development applies not only to the sub-
stance of the securitization transactions but also to their enforcement.
Private actors’ self enforcement are emerging together with enforce-
ment mechanisms provided by trade, business, professional, govern-
ment, self regulatory and international organizations.  In varying de-
grees, such enforcement mechanisms are prohibitive, regulatory and
permissive.
The laws governing cross-border securitization are developed
first by decentralized lawmaking “markets,” and then absorbed by
centralized lawmaking of communities, large intermediaries, and
corporations.7  However, the laws do not begin in the marketplace
and end with centralized domestic lawmaking.  In fact, the lawmaking
process evolves cyclically with ever increasing pace.8  Securitization
lawmaking is both decentralized, emanating from market actors, and
centralized, established by communities and governments.  Even af-
ter domestic laws are enacted, private innovators continue to create
6. On the history of the Law Merchant, see 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
1.94 at 29 (2d ed. 1990).
7. See Cooter, supra note 5, at 1694 (arguing that law makers should find the business
norms and community norms, see whether the norms have been internalized, and enforce the
norms that pass the test).
8. See id. at 1683.
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law.  Decentralized and centralized lawmaking interact and counter-
balance each other’s shortcomings.  In addition, continued decen-
tralized lawmaking is triggered by a dynamic and complex environ-
ment in which the securitization-intermediation process takes place.
This Article argues that this seemingly unpredictable process is more
efficient and more effective for experimenting and avoiding disas-
trous mistakes than ad hoc legislation and rule-making.9
Is this movement leading to a central lawmaker that would
promulgate international law?  Although there are calls for such an
institution I doubt whether it is likely to arise any time soon.  Instead
I argue that we will probably see the development of more uniform
international norms and a number of market mechanisms for conflict
resolution and enforcement.  The process resembles a common law
on a global scale.  Such a process appears when members of a trade
or professional group interact to establish their ground rules.10
Cross-border securitization is a particularly useful subject for ex-
amining legal change, especially in a state environment.  Actors in se-
curitization have an enormous degree of freedom to choose their
theater of operations in an overall changing legal environment.  Their
“raw material” is capital—a highly transferable commodity—and
their theater of operations is the globe.  Yet they need predictable
rules and standards in order to operate efficiently.  The actors can
usually utilize existing legal forms and apply them to any one of the
discrete components of securitization without necessarily affecting
the entire law applicable to the other components in the process.
Therefore, the evolution of securitization law may help provide in-
sight into legal change in similar areas.
II. INTRODUCING CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATION
This Part discusses the main characteristics of securitization,
cross-border aspects of securitization, and the main reasons for the
emergence of cross-border securitization.
A. Securitization
1.  Securitization as a System of Intermediation.  Securitization is
a new system of intermediation among savers/investors and
9. See id. at 1682 (contending that repeated transactions tend to create efficient norms).
10. See Tamar Frankel, Should Funds and Investment Advisers Establish a Self-Regulatory
Organization?, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 447 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1997).
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borrowers/issuers, merging traditional intermediation systems of
markets and institutions.  Securitization can arise when institutional
intermediaries are inadequately performing their functions.  It can be
used to by-pass traditional banks and insurance companies or similar
institutions that fail to provide adequate financing or services.11  The
United States developed securitization in the 1970s when banks and
savings and loan associations did not operate well and did not
perform the functions of intermediation effectively.12
By merging institutional, in particular banking, and market in-
termediation, securitization offers many of their advantages while re-
ducing their disadvantages to the parties.  Like market intermedia-
tion, securitization offers investors liquid securities.  Unlike market
intermediation, however, borrowers need not issue marketable obli-
gations to the markets; they can borrow from institutions that then
securitize the loans.
Like banking, securitization bridges the gap between the de-
mands of borrowers and savers, but it achieves this goal by different
mechanisms.  For example, the process utilizes rating to reduce in-
formation costs to investors, and credit enhancement and diversifica-
tion of borrowers’ loan portfolios to lower investors’ risks from bor-
rowers’ failures.  Further, while banks provide “bundled” services
(raising funds, usually through deposits,13 originating and servicing
loans, and holding them to maturity), securitization has “unbundled”
these functions, enabling separate actors to perform one or more of
these functions and linking the actors through a sponsor rather than
one super-intermediary.  This “unbundling” and the use of special-
ized actors can enhance efficiency.
Securitization has undercut the hegemony of traditional banking.
However, it offers banks advantages of reducing their risks by selling
loans and increasing gains by fee income.  Banks and bank holding
companies have entered the securitization arena by providing select
services in the process including the market functions.14
11. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 403 (noting that in the securitization process intermedi-
aries direct the flow of funds from savers that do not lend, such as pension funds and insurance
companies, to borrowers, and that intermediaries can reduce the enforcement costs of parties,
particularly in volatile markets).
12. See Fernandez, supra note 2, at 358-59 (describing the development of the mortgage-
backed securities market).
13. For an overview of financial systems see Dwight B. Crane & Zvi Bodie, The Trans-
formation of Banking, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 109 (securitization separates func-
tions and reintegrates them in different ways).
14. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-4.17, at 132-56; Robert A. Eisenbeis, Asset Secu-
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According to neoclassical economics, the securitization process
offer global benefits because capital flows to the most productive
uses around the globe, providing higher returns for investors. Argua-
bly, however, the process can produce a significant number of losers,
especially in those countries that will remain without funding sup-
port.  Further, cross-border transactions may also facilitate money
laundering, tax avoidance, and circumvention of regulatory require-
ments of particular countries.  One example relates to the use of bar-
ter to avoid foreign currency restrictions through counter-trades.
Thus, U.S. wheat is traded for Soviet vodka, which can be traded to
Germany for deutsche marks, which are subsequently exchanged for
dollars.  Goods and valuables can be bought without using hard cur-
rency by “paying” for them with other goods.15  An example of avoid-
ance of regulation is the movement of U.S. institutional intermediar-
ies to Europe, and the creation of the Eurodollar markets in which
U.S. banks engaged in securities transactions in which they were pro-
hibited to engage in the United States.16  However, the debate about
whether securitization is good or bad, and to whom, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
2.  The Stages of the Securitization Process.  The process of
securitization is divided into discrete stages, each of which can be
performed by a different entity: loans are made; the loans are
transferred to a special purpose vehicle (a corporation or a trust); the
special purpose vehicle issues securities to investors; the risk posed
by the portfolio of the vehicle is reduced through various mechanisms
for credit enhancement; and the portfolio is serviced by collecting the
borrowers’ payments and distributing the proceeds to investors after
covering costs.17
Like other forms of intermediation, the process funnels capital
from investors to borrowers.  Unlike banking and market intermedia-
ritization and Internationalization: Themes for the Future of the Financial Services Industry,
1990 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 347, 349-50.
15. See Robert D. Kase, Petroleum Perestroika; Oil and Gas Free Market in the Soviet
Union, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Jan. 1992, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
16. The problem of regulation and taxation avoidance and especially of money laundering
is outside the topic of this Article.  It is mentioned, however, as recognition that not all aspects
of cross-border securitization can be viewed as positive.  Governments have become more ac-
tive since technology and financial systems facilitate cross-border money laundering, and have
cooperated in efforts to avoid sheltering and helping such activities.  Clearly, the efforts are not
fully effective, but the very cooperation may be seen as a positive development.
17. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 135-36.
FRANKEL5.DOC 12/16/98  12:26 PM
1998] CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATION:  WITHOUT LAW, BUT NOT LAWLESS 261
tion, however, the process consists of discrete functions or services
that can be performed by different entities in different combinations,
and these services are available in the markets.
3.  Securitization and Trust as Innovations.  A comparison of
securitization with the concept of “trust” highlights the innovative
aspect of securitization and its special qualities.  The innovation of
securitization is similar to the innovation of the trust in the Anglo-
American legal system in a number of ways.
First, both mechanisms use a “splitting technique.”  The trust
splits property rights in a unique way separating control and benefits
and vesting them in different parties.  Securitization splits property
rights in a similar way, and, in addition, splits the institutional func-
tions usually performed by banks and similar intermediaries, and al-
lows different parties to perform one or more of these functions.
Second, both mechanisms put property in a kind of suspended
animation.  During the trust period, the trustee acts for the benefit of
the would-be owners but he is not subject to their control.  Nor is he
subject to the control of the previous owner.  And even though the
trustee controls the property he is not the owner either.  A similar
situation occurs in securitization.  The sellers of the financial assets
are no longer the owners.  The buyers are only beneficial owners, and
the trustee controls the assets but does not benefit from them (except
by fees). This trust mechanism is an integral part of securitization.
Third, both trust and securitization encourage market transac-
tions.  Trust maintains the simplicity of property law by vesting in the
trustee legal ownership towards third parties, yet allows the creation
of in personam property rights in the beneficiaries.  The property
rights of the beneficiaries vis a vis the trustee are very flexible and
can be designed by the trustor (with the trustee’s consent) in almost
infinite ways.  Thus, while market transactions by the trustee can be
effected through the simple and fixed legal property estates the rights
of the beneficiaries against the trustee can be highly complex and
varied.
Similarly, securitization splits the loan or obligation transaction.
Borrowers are obligated under certain terms.  Investors, however, are
entitled under other terms.  Through the process, the whole or parts
of the borrowers’ obligations can be converted into securities.  For
example, assume that a portion of certain financial assets has the
equivalent of a treasury bond’s zero credit risk.  The residual finan-
cial assets represent risk above this benchmark zero risk.  By using a
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special purpose vehicle (a trust or a corporation), sponsors are able
to isolate the part that represents zero risk from the rest of the risks,
securitize these separate parts and sell either or both in the securities
markets.  As a result, securitization can be extremely complex in cre-
ating rights that are subject to sale in the markets.  However, when
these rights reach the markets they can be offered in the form of sim-
ple, standardized and predictable instruments, i.e., securities, which
mend themselves better to efficient trading in the markets.  Thus, se-
curitization requires a trust mechanism to convert illiquid financial
assets (assets of the special purpose vehicle) to liquid assets
(obligations of the vehicle).
Fourth, both trust and securitization allow for terms that fit the
special needs of the beneficiaries/investors.  Trust allows for flexible
arrangement among the beneficiaries and trustees and can also be
used in different business contexts.  Securitization allows for terms
that fit the special needs of the investors; it is also sufficiently flexible
to accommodate the desires of borrowers, and can also be used in dif-
ferent business contexts.
Fifth, trust and securitization are also used for similar purposes.
Historically, the trust was used to by-pass prohibitions on devising as-
sets by inheritance and imposition of taxes; today trusts continue to
be used for such purposes.18  Likewise cross-border securitization can
be utilized to avoid taxes and regulation because the activities and
the payments can be placed outside a taxing country.
Sixth, trust and securitization are intermediaries.  The trust in-
termediates between beneficiaries and issuers of the obligations in
which the trust invests.  Similarly, securitization intermediates be-
tween investors and borrowers.
Trusts and securitization are also different.  As compared to se-
curitization, trusts are established and managed with fewer separate
links.  In securitization, borrowers may borrow from lenders and
lenders may pass the borrowers’ obligations to special purpose vehi-
cles, which raise funds from investors and allow these funds to pass
through to the lenders to borrowers.  In a trust, there are only two
distinct links: the trustee issues certificates representing claims
against the trust’s portfolio and invests the funds in financial instru-
ments.  The trust resembles only the part of the securitization process
that uses the special purpose vehicle.
18. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN JR., ET. AL., WILLS AND ESTATES §8.1 at 297-300
(1988).
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In contrast to a private trust, securitization eliminates or weak-
ens the personal relationships between the various participants.  This
characteristic is a function of the number of investors, and explains
why the Massachusetts business trust,19 serving a large numbers of in-
vestors, is similar in this respect to securitization.20
B. Cross-Border View: Not Only International and Multinational,
But Cross-Border
Securitization offers actors opportunities to develop expertise in
parts of the process, or draw on expertise available in the global mar-
kets.  Similarly, the process offers actors opportunities to structure
transactions in locations around the globe that provide a receptive
environment, and avoid those with a less welcoming and a more
costly environment.  Further, cross-border securitization allows for
efficient and cost reducing credit enhancement mechanisms to lower
the cost of capital.  For example, foreign investors’ cost of evaluating
domestic borrowers is higher than the cost of utilizing a credible do-
mestic institution that can provide credit enhancement to investors.
The savings can be then divided among the sponsors, borrowers, and
investors.21  The segmented nature of securitization allows for cross-
border design that can optimize efficiency through expertise and cost
avoidance.
To be sure, large institutions could perform all parts of the secu-
ritization process since they may have internally the required exper-
tise and domestically an attractive operating environment.  If the in-
stitutions are multinational, they may take advantage of the
environment or expertise that is offered elsewhere.  However, if
cross-border opportunities outside the institution are more attrac-
tive,22 such institutions may still take advantage of these opportuni-
19. A Massachusetts business trust is an organization that functions similarly to a corpora-
tion but is organized as a private trust. See Sheldon A. Jones, et. al., The Massachusetts Business
Trusts and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 439 (1988) (noting that
shareholders hold the beneficial interest in the trust property but trustees manage the prop-
erty).
20. See id.
21. This idea was triggered by Professor Hill’s article on reduction of political risks
through securitization. The same idea can be applied to other situations in which domestic ac-
tors can reduce the costs of foreign investors.  See Claire Hill, How Investors React to Political
Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283(1998).
22. See Reducing the Risks of Outsourced IT, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, § 4 (Survey-
Mastering Global Business), at 2 (discussing major trends in IT outsourcing, including offshore
outsourcing); Strategies for Global Outsourcing, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998 § 4 (Survey-
Mastering Global Business), at 5 (discussing reasons for global sourcing, types of sourcing rela-
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ties.
Securitization should be contrasted with a unitary financial insti-
tution that combines under one roof most or all financial services,
from lending and funding to insurance and distribution of marketable
securities.  The difference between the two is the extent to which cen-
tral control and planning plays a part.  The securitization regime al-
lows one or more entrepreneurs to perform particular services and
combine them through market intermediation.  Loans, insurance
(credit enhancement), distribution of securities, management of
pools of financial assets, loan servicing, and legal and accounting
services can all be bought in the markets.  Although there are many
combinations of in-house and out-sourced services in both cases, se-
curitization does not require a guiding or governing hand throughout
the process.  In that sense it is more market than institution oriented.
Securitization leaves more freedom to entrepreneurs and initiators
than institutional planning would.23
Cross-border securitization allows each link in the process to be
performed in a different country.  One way in which to understand
the process is by analogy to multinational corporations.  For example,
United States corporations have long exported their products to for-
eign countries.  In that sense the corporations were engaged in inter-
national business.  At some point, however, these corporations be-
come multinational.24  The transition occurred when the
managements of these corporations began to view the whole globe as
their theater of operation.  They no longer assumed that their manu-
facturing, marketing, or purchasing should be located exclusively in
the U.S. Instead, they established various parts of their operations in
different countries.  This global view has changed the strategies of the
corporations in a fundamental way.  No longer were the U.S., its
plants, employees and currency the starting points of management
planning.  A decision on where to build a plant required a survey of
the globe in terms of cost, transportation, markets, political stability,
and other environmental factors, as well as the relationship between
other globally dispersed parts of the enterprise.
tionships, and factors considered in choosing between them); Jai Shanker, IBM Goes after
Global Outsourcing Market, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at 5 (noting growth in global
outsourcing market).
23. This is true generally. However, institutions have different degrees of centralized
planning and control. While some may be tightly controlled centrally, others may constitute a
loose network of divisions of entrepreneurs.
24. See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 19-32 (1995)
(explaining the origins of multinational corporations).
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Cross-border securitization reflects a similar method and view,
whether the decision makers are intermediaries, investors or borrow-
ers.  The main actors, however, are the sponsors.  A decision to secu-
ritize across particular borders depends on (i) opportunities to create
an inventory of financial assets by originating, buying, or selling; (ii)
optimal regulation and tax laws;25 (iii) various risks and their levels;
and (iv) absence or presence of an institutional or legal infrastruc-
ture. In such a case, cross-border securitization serves as an alterna-
tive to missing laws or appropriate intermediaries.
In cases where the domestic legal, tax or regulatory accounting
framework makes securitization difficult, but where the law permits
transfers of title, an alternative may be to structure a transaction in
an “offshore center” and to launch the issue in the Euro-
markets . . . .  For countries whose currency is not widely used in-
ternationally and which do not intend to function as major interna-
tional financial centers, this may be an efficient means of gaining
the benefits of securitization without major changes in domestic in-
frastructure.26
Offshore securitization can be condemned as a means of avoid-
ing regulation, tax rules, and currency exchange restrictions.  Cross-
border securitization also can be praised as a valuable tool for using
the best combination of securitization actors and activities around the
globe. The judgment depends on the viewers’ point of view.
Cross-border securitization develops when the optimal condi-
tions for securitization are absent in the country where investors,
originators or borrowers reside.  Optimal conditions include a busi-
ness and legal infrastructure to support the securitization process and
absence of taxes or regulation that sponsors of the process find bur-
densome.  Thus, when legal systems do not allow, or put burdens on,
assigning or selling financial assets, they create an almost insur-
mountable barrier to securitizing assets in their jurisdictions.  For ex-
ample, there are gaps in Italy’s legal and regulatory framework, in-
25. See Cecile Gutscher, Commercial Banks Flock to Ireland Seeking Tax Breaks, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Jan. 15, 1997, at 19, available in WESTLAW, WSJ-EURO Database.
26. Securitisation: An International Perspective, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, June 1995, at 33,
57 (“[A] considerable volume of cross-border securitization is taking place, mainly in the form
of sale of receivables to offshore SPVs. Securities created in this matter [sic] are marketed to
the international investor community. Some cross-border securitization is undertaken by insti-
tutions based in countries where domestic securitization is relatively easy. At the same time,
even when domestic infrastructure renders securitization impractical, market participants have
found cross-border activity to be a means of engaging in securitization.  Thus, many non-
financial companies in several countries have used offshore companies to issue ABS and MBS
in cases where domestic systems made such operations impossible.”), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
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cluding the lack of specific legislation, problems involving taxation,
and legal aspects involving transfer of title that impede securitization
in that country.27  European countries do not have a trust concept.28
That makes it difficult to establish a special purpose vehicle.
Where such barriers exist, financial assets originated in one
country are often structured in another country.  For example, Lon-
don is the location of major sponsors that package assets originated
in other countries and distribute the securities backed by these assets.
The securities are structured to meet the demands of investors in par-
ticular markets; for example, the European market.  The special pur-
pose vehicles used to securitize these assets, however, are often lo-
cated not in London but in other financial centers, such as the
Channel Islands.29
Similarly, because infrastructure is inadequate, no mortgage
backed securities have been issued in Italy “but a small number of car
loans and leases have been securitized, mainly using offshore SPVs.”30
The process of building an infrastructure is sometimes piecemeal.
For example, Japan’s government allowed leasing and consumer
credit companies to sell receivables to offshore special purpose vehi-
cles before it allowed securitization in Japan.31  Cross-border securiti-
zation will follow after Japan accommodates the securitization proc-
ess.
Sometimes developing countries seek foreign investors to help
modernize and discipline their domestic intermediaries and borrow-
ers (including issuing enterprises).32  If, for example, banks in a par-
ticular country do not perform their lending functions prudently, oth-
ers can perform their functions.  The new lenders can be other
domestic institutions, but even more importantly, they can be foreign
entrepreneurs, provided the country’s government accepts foreign
lenders.
27. See id. at 49.
28. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Le-
gal and Economic Analysis, N.Y.U. L. REV. (Forthcoming 1998).
29. See Securitisation: An International Perspective, supra note 26, at 49.  The publication
also states that not all countries have accepted securitization or changed the laws that are nec-
essary for securitization to flourish. For example, France decided to develop its own laws, and
Norway determined not to use securitization as a remedy to its banking problems. See id. at 48,
50.
30. Id. at 49.
31. See id. at 51.
32. For example, on December 4, 1997, the government of Malaysia hosted a conference
concerning securitization in which many OPEC members states, especially from the Pacific Ba-
sin, participated.
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Markets can discipline domestic banks even absent foreign lend-
ers.  If the domestic banks desire to sell their loans abroad, the un-
derwriting standards and specifications will be dictated to a large ex-
tent by the buyers.  For instance, in the United States, GNMA,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are the largest mortgage buyers,
virtually establish the underwriting standards for mortgage lending,
and thereby affect the prudence standards of U.S. banks that are
mortgage lenders.33
Interestingly, the buyers have an incentive to reduce the costs of
origination.  Based on the statistical data that they have accumulated,
they have reduced the information that they require the borrowers to
provide.  While small banks may continue to demand of their bor-
rowers detailed information and spend their resources verifying the
information, Freddie Mac needs only the information that is relevant
to its enormous pool of mortgages.  Details that constitute a “wash”
or are not statistically significant can be eliminated.  Originating
lenders, whether banks or mortgage bankers or others, can reduce
their information costs which lowers the transaction costs and ulti-
mately the borrowers’ costs.
Securitization has exposed lending banks to competition from
other lenders that used to finance their operations by borrowing from
banks, thus incurring higher cost of capital.  If these lenders have
available to them buyers of the loans, they need less capital, or only
interim capital to make the loans and assemble loan portfolios for
sale.  These non-bank lenders, with lower cost of operations, pose se-
rious competition to banks.
In such cases, the government’s regulatory role is reduced be-
cause sophisticated buyers who have power to demand loans made
prudentially.  Thus, these buyers impose on lenders market discipline
and relieve the government of the regulatory burden.  Market buyers
and competition sanction banks for adopting lax underwriting stan-
dards in violation of the regulatory standards.
A similar idea was voiced in the 1997 conference: Comparative
Study of Internationalization of Emerging Markets and Its Applica-
tion to China, Beijing, China.  At this conference, it was suggested
that even if China does not necessarily need foreign currency it needs
foreign investors to exercise market discipline on state enterprises
that are privatized by issuing securities to investors.  For example,
33. See Jane Schulkoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws of Lead-Based Paint: From
Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 551 (1994) (noting Fannie
Mae’s role in setting underwriting standards).
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foreign investors could insist that these issuers adopt internationally
acceptable accounting systems.34  Today, countries have incentives to
cooperate in regulating securitization and other forms of intermedia-
tion because high capital mobility can make each country’s investors
hostage to the other countries’ policies.
Although the sponsors of securitization do not necessarily make
it their priority, they serve some countries by offering an alternative
to ineffective institutional intermediaries in these countries.  Spon-
sors that realize the benefits they bring in this respect use these bene-
fits to support their request for entry and changes in the legal infra-
structure of the countries.
Cross-border securitization encourages foreign investments. In-
vestors have a “home bias,”35 because foreign investments pose risks
related to lack of information, foreign exchange, and government ac-
tions.36  Nonetheless, investors are attracted to foreign investments by
the promise of higher returns.  Cross-border securitization offers
them risk diversification, and an alternative to investments in foreign
projects that is more liquid.37
C. Innovators in the Area of Cross-Borer Securitization Seem to
Give Away Their Innovations Instead of Creating Property
Rights in Them. How Are the Innovators Compensated For
Their Investments and Efforts? Why Are They Interested in
Standards Based on Their Creations?
Presumably, those who create innovative cross-border securitiza-
tion models expect to recoup their costs and reap rewards.  They in-
vest time and creativity (which may be a limited resource).  They as-
sume the risk that their innovation would not be marketable, or will
not receive the necessary government approval, or that their innova-
tions will have a short life span.
1.  Why Don’t Innovators Try to “Propertize” Their Innovations?
One way in which innovators could reap rewards is by seeking
trademarks, copyrights and patents to propertize their innovations
and extract payments from those who would wish to use or copy
them.  Yet, it seems that innovators in domestic and cross-border
34. See Comparative Study of Internationalization of Emerging Markets and Its Applica-
tion to China (1997) (notes on file with the Author).
35. See Fox, supra note 3, at 724-25.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 724.
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securitization, like those in the financial services area, rarely resort to
these measures.38
2. Giving Innovations Away.  By and large, innovators seem to
give away their innovations. In some cases they have no choice.
When innovators need to obtain regulators’ approvals for their
structures, they “give away” their ideas to competitors when
approvals are publicized.  But innovators give away their unique
creative structures voluntarily by advertising in law review articles39
and on the Internet.40  They compete for a chance to speak at
conferences attended by lawyers.41  They work with peers on uniform
contracts and model laws in trade and professional associations,42
United Nations projects,43 and other international organizations.44
Presumably, advertising their innovation and participating and
leading movements to design a uniform law bestows on the innova-
tors prestige and enhances their reputation.  Standardization and
publication of a proven innovation allows innovators to “sit on their
laurels,” at least for a while.  It also allows them to meet other mov-
ers and shakers in their area and learn from them.  There is a great
satisfaction in having an impact on the law of countries and the work
and life of many persons.  However, these activities generate costs
38. For example, the creators of the “hub and spoke” structure for mutual funds have
taken a trademark and patent on the name and structure.  See infra note 46.
39. See Meredith S. Jackson, Leap of Faith: Asset-Based Lending to Asset-Backed Securi-
ties - A Case Study, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 193 (1995).
40. See e.g., Chapman Tripp, Securitisation: A Beginner’s Guide (visited March 31, 1998)
<http://www.chapmantripp.co.nz/publish/fl180697.htm> (explaining securitization, posted by a
New Zealand law firm); Jason H.P. Kravitt, Coping with Cross-Border Securitisation, (visited
Nov. 13, 1997) <http://demo.iii.com:106/search/akrafft+susan/-5,-1,0,B/frameset&a+kravitt+
jason+h+p&1,6,-1>.
41. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE
ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION
(ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No. CA10 1995).
42. See, e.g., U.C.C. (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). American Law
Institute Transnational Insolvency Project; International Statement of United States Bank-
ruptcy Law Tentative Draft (Apr. 15, 1997).
43. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group on
International Contract Practices, Twenty-Seventh Session, New York, 23 June-3 July, 1997, Re-
ceivables Financing (on file with author).
44. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996); PRINCIPLES
OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (1997). This behavior is prevalent in other areas of the finan-
cial services. J.P. Morgan has developed a software to track the risk level of investment portfo-
lios and offered the software free.  See Peter Heap, J.P. Morgan Gives an Answer to Problem of
Measuring Risk, BOND BUYER, Mar. 21, 1995, at 8, cited in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
REVOLUTION 333, 348 (Clifford E. Kirsch, ed., 1997).
FRANKEL5.DOC 12/16/98  12:26 PM
270 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 8:255
rather than monetary rewards for work done.
The answer to this puzzle seems to contain both the negative as-
pects of attempting to create enforceable copyright, patent, and
trademark rights, on the one hand, and the far more fruitful and
profitable results of giving the innovation for free.  In the area of fi-
nancial services, recapturing of the costs and reaping the monetary
rewards from innovative structure through trademarks, copyrights
and patents has been unsuccessful.  First, the name of the product is
rarely unique, and other descriptive names are abundant.  For exam-
ple, the creators of the “hub and spoke” structure for mutual funds
have taken a trademark and patent on the name and structure.45
However, other lawyers and the regulators chose “master-feeder
funds” to describe essentially the same structure, thus by-passing the
trademark issue. Later, the patent was not recognized.46  Today, com-
puterized investment management systems are of “suspect value.”47
Second, the innovative structure itself can be used with sufficient
variations that would distinguish it from the original.  Third, it is very
difficult to shelter financial innovations under existing laws.  Fourth,
copyright protects software code, but not the ideas underlying the
code, allowing competitors to duplicate the ideas by designing differ-
ent codes that achieve the same result.48
45. See infra note 46.
46. See Exemption for Open-End Management Investment Companies Issuing Multiple
Classes of Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,955 (Dec. 15, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg.
68,074, 68,075-76 & n.3 (Dec. 23, 1993) (referring to funds as “master-feeder” and referring to
“Hub and Spoke” service mark only in footnote); State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group., Inc, 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996); U.S. Court Strikes “Hub and Spoke”
Trademark, FUNDS INTL., Apr. 1996, at 9 (noting that other firms have trademarked similar
structures), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Further, in 1996 a federal district court invalidated the patent for the accounting sys-
tem for managing the Hub and Spoke structure. The court ruled that the subject matter is un-
patentable as the system is a “mathematical algorithm” involving no “physical transformation,”
and a “business method.” See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F.
Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996). If the decision is affirmed on appeal, it will indicate that patents for
financial and investment management systems are of “suspect value.” See Steven B. Pokotilow
& Andrew G. Isztwan, Court Casts Shadow on Patenting Financial Software, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, June 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.  Similarly, Mer-
rill Lynch has trademarked the name of its Cash Management Account. See Merrill Enhances
CMA, WALL ST. LETTER, Dec. 21, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
The product is also patented. See CW Staff, Intelligence Files, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 22,
1993, at 67, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. However, it has become a
“commodity product”  because most other securities firms offer similar products. See Randall
Smith, Merrill’s Once-Revolutionary CMA Is Losing Its Edge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1993, at C1.
47. See Pokotilow & Isztwan, supra note 46, at 7.
48. See generally Himanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the
Current Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEV. L. REV. 19 (1995).
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Clearly financial innovators incur substantial costs in creating
new products and bear the risk of losing their competitive edge if
these innovations can be easily and quickly copied by others.  There-
fore, unless protected by copyright and patent laws, these costs and
risks may dampen the incentives of innovators to innovate.  In re-
sponse there is also a suggestion that current laws provide some pro-
tection for such innovations, and that innovators should take advan-
tage of the laws.49  More importantly, it seems that innovations in the
financial area, including securitization, are abundant, suggesting that
there is little need to provide innovators more incentives to produce
novel products.
In contrast, and paradoxically, “giving away” an innovation pro-
vides many monetary benefits.  To begin with, these giveaways may
not be complete.  Unlike disclosure in applications for patents, dis-
closures of innovations in advertising, presentations or professional
publications are not as complete and detailed.  Certain experiences,
drawbacks and danger points are likely to be omitted.  Some say that
following cookbooks of famous chefs rarely seems to produce dishes
that taste as the chefs’ dishes do.  That is not necessarily done by in-
tentionally avoiding an important ingredient from the recipe
(although some cooks would be tempted to do so).  In a complex area
with different actors, it is difficult to transfer fully information in such
publications so that the reader can replicate the activity without
hands on guidance.  Just as the water, cooking utensils, and ingredi-
ents may not be identical to those used by the author-chefs, so will
the quality of the financial assets, the type of clients and the legal en-
vironment of the transactor differ from those of the innovators.
These differences may produce difficulties for the novices.
Second, to be valuable, innovations must be recognized and fol-
lowed.  Innovation can be costly to users because there is less infor-
mation about their effects; their novelty produces uncertainty that
may result in failure and losses.  The greater the use of the innova-
tion, the lower the users’ risks would be, and the more users will be
willing to adopt it.  A broad adoption of an innovation verifies and
enhances its value, thus proving the success of the innovation.  There-
fore, innovators may initially give away their innovations to produce
49. See STEPHEN JUDLOWE, CHRISTOPHER PETRUZZI, & MARGUERITE DEL VALLE,
PATENT AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR INNOVATIONS IN FINANCE (Salomon Bros. Cen-
ter Working Paper 1988) (arguing that innovators who seek copyright and patent laws’ protec-
tions for financial innovations may reap rich rewards while those who neglect to protect them-
selves may lose these rewards “forever”).
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broader adoption.
Third, if potential clients are convinced of the value of the inno-
vation, they seek the innovators’ services.  Repeat performance is far
less costly to the innovators than to their competitors.  Even as com-
pared to peers, innovators have an advantage during the learning pe-
riod of their competitors.  Some service providers would be happy to
resort to the innovators because their cost of learning outweighs their
benefits if their clients seldom seek these services.  Thus, innovators
benefit from peers’ referrals.
Fourth, innovators reap the rewards of prestige from enhancing
their reputation.  For some people, these rewards may be the main
driver. 
Some of the advantages described above are not available except
under certain conditions: First, the innovation must be complicated.
Otherwise the innovation can be easily replicated, and novices will be
less eager to pay innovators for guidance. Second, the recipients of
the innovators’ services must be peers, colleagues, and clients. They
have an interest in maintaining this system and would support one ac-
tor to obtain reciprocal support later. Third, the system will work
best in a specialized industry. Repeated transactions tend to produce
efficient industry norms, and, as the discussion in the following sec-
tion demonstrates, in a specialized business, the maintenance of these
norms is valuable to all members.50
In some cases, if an innovation is prepared for a client that val-
ues the advantage of being “the first” or if the transaction is very
large, the client is usually able to reward the innovator because the
expected profits are very high. In this case the client may preclude
the innovator from giving the innovation away, at least until the cli-
ent reaps the value of the innovation. The creator, however, is fully
compensated at the outset.
The question is whether we need to shelter the innovations
through property law. The main reason for sheltering innovations is
to provide innovators with incentives, monetary or otherwise, to
spend their energies on such innovations. When such incentives are
missing, the imposition of financial barriers on the use of innovations
and the free flow of ideas may be justified. Yet innovative designers
in the securitization area seem to have ample incentives to continue
50. See Cooter, supra note 5, at 1680 (“Specialized business is often organized so that effi-
cient norms emerge from repeated transactions.”).  Those players that cheat on industry norms
are likely to be those with short time horizons.  See id.
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to innovate, as is demonstrated by the extent to which securitization
and cross-border securitization have spread all over the world. Until
the creativity of these innovators dries up for lack of incentives, there
is little justification to impose barriers on the free use of these inno-
vations.
In sum, innovators in the securitization area are rewarded by ad-
vertising their innovations and sharing them with their peers.  This
method of reward is crucial to the development of the law of cross-
border securitization, and to the process by which this law is created.
This topic is discussed in the following Part.
III. HOW CAN CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATION EXIST
WITHOUT A UNIFORM LAW?
By definition, cross-border securitization is not governed by one
legal system.51  Securitization may take various shapes and forms and
have different effects on participants depending on which of its parts
resides on which countries’ shores. Theoretically, cross-border securi-
tization transactions can be effected with no governing country law,
or under a very lax fully enabling country law.
Yet, neither market nor institutional intermediation can be cre-
ated, let alone flourish, without uniform, predictable, stable rules of
behavior that govern their participants’ activities. How, then, did
cross-border securitization arise in the first place? And how come it
is spreading so fast to so many countries, including those without the
full financial and legal infrastructure that securitization requires?
A.  Creating Securitization Law
The law of cross-border securitization consists of many country
laws, usually chosen by private actors. Therefore, the identity and
substance of these laws are not uniform. Two general related ques-
tions arise in this context: When is uniform, standardized law pre-
ferred to non-standard law of the parties’ choices? A related question
is: how should decentralized markets and centralized authorities in-
teract as lawmakers and enforcers? This section highlights these diffi-
cult issues in the context of cross-border securitization, and helps un-
derstand why a less uniform law is effective in this area.
51. See Fox, supra note 3, at 729 (“The distinctive feature about the rules that govern the
behavior of parties to cross border financial transactions is the absence of a single, unitary legal
system.”).
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1.  Uniform Law v. The Parties’ Choices: Decentralized Markets
v. Central Authorities.  The issue of imposed uniform law versus
parties’ choices is closely related to the issue of the interaction of
market and central authorities as lawmakers for business
transactions. Professor Robert Cooter has argued that the “law
merchant” designed by parties in a lawmaking decentralized market
is more efficient than, and therefore preferable to, law enacted by a
central power, such as a community, or a government. In Professor
Cooter’s opinion, central lawmakers should absorb the substance of
laws created in a market process, generally in a permissive rather
than mandatory mode.52
Uniform centralized law and market laws of the parties’ choice
pose costs and offer benefits.53 Uniform laws are more predictable,
reducing the parties’ costs of information, uncertainty, and learning.
In contrast, less predictable market-unique arrangements require
parties to engage in continuous inventing, and to incur higher nego-
tiation and enforcement costs because the behavior of others is not
subject to default rules, and is less predictable.
Uniform laws, however, increase the parties’ costs by imposing
one size on many transactions, regardless of fit or parties’ needs; by
limiting experiments and innovations; and by delaying quick adapta-
tion that is crucial in volatile situations. Further, uniform laws estab-
lished by a centralized lawmaker are not likely to be as efficient as
market laws. Centralized laws present compromises necessary to
reach acceptance by a larger number of stakeholders with different,
and perhaps conflicting, incentives and agendas. 
Most legal systems develop through both centralized and market
lawmaking. Cross-border securitization, however, provides an exam-
ple of a leading decentralized lawmaking where the predominant
forces that shape the law are anchored in ad hoc market transactions.
There are a number of reasons for this development.
First, cross-border securitization is an innovation that allows ac-
tors to greatly minimize, if not fully escape, centralized country laws,
in favor of alternative legal systems. Just as securitization reduces the
costs of doing business under inefficient intermediation systems,
cross-border securitization reduces the costs of doing business under
inefficient country laws. These costs seem to be greater than the costs
of non-uniform applicable law.
52. See Cooter, supra note 5.
53. See Cooter, id.
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Second, especially in its initial stages, cross-border securitization
requires that parties be free to design the applicable law, even at the
expense of uniformity.  That allows parties to experiment, and to re-
duce their learning costs by contracting on applicable domestic laws.54
Third, securitization in general is less sensitive to the benefits of
uniformity.  Because securitization is fragmented, the law governing
the process can be fragmented as well, to fit the actors’ needs.  For
example, for public distribution of asset-backed securities sponsors
are likely to choose a jurisdiction with active securities markets, such
as the United Kingdom or the United States whose laws are adequate
to accommodate this aspect of securitization.55  For private placement
of securities to large sophisticated investors, sponsors may seek juris-
dictions that do not strictly regulate securities issuance and sales, be-
cause these investors may choose to require of sponsors the informa-
tion they need.
Fourth, because securitization is a “wholesale” business involv-
ing large amounts, the cost of non-uniform law can be distributed
over a large number of ultimate investors.
2.  The Quest For Uniformity.  While actors continue to create ad
hoc unique transactions, they also gradually work towards more uni-
form laws.  Accepted and repeated designs or contracts become
“vanilla” documents, emerging as customs, which, in turn, are
adopted as model contracts and rules by trade and professional asso-
ciations, organizations of intermediaries, international ad hoc and
standing committees, and regulators’ organizations.  All these repre-
sent a modern “law merchant,” eventually absorbed into domestic
laws that facilitate securitization.56.
54. Private actors can compete for recognition and leadership in designating applicable
country laws, usually the country of their main residence and legal expertise.
55. In  the event that these laws are not initially fully accommodating, they are fairly
promptly amended to do so. See, e.g., 2 FRANKEL, supra note 1, §13.5.5-13.6, at 71-73
(preemption of state laws).
56. The modern international law merchant is being developed in the area of swaps.  Most
swaps transaction participants use a single “master agreement” for all their transactions with a
particular counterparty. The International Swap & Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) pub-
lishes two standardized contracts for documenting interest rate and currency deals. Participants
may choose either the ISDA Multi-Currency—Cross Border Master Agreement or the ISDA
Currency—Single Jurisdiction Master Agreement, depending on the nature of their counter-
party and the transactions contemplated.
The first mentioned contract is used for swaps of U.S. dollar interest rate. By its terms,
this contract is governed by New York law. The second mentioned contract is used for swaps of
international currency and interest rate. Under this contract the parties may choose the appli-
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The movement to unification has appeared on various fronts.
Regulators are fostering unification on the international level;57. oth-
ers are advocating alternatives to uniform substantive securities
regulation by reducing investors’ information costs through private
actors such as rating agencies and investment company managers.58
A number of countries have amended their laws along the models of
private and international models.59  Puerto Rico has recently adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code.60  Some countries have adjusted their
laws in light of the models.61  Some have adopted foreign laws in full,
directly or by reference.62  Some countries chose to maintain their
cability of New York or English law.
The two ISDA master agreements are substantively identical, except for language
necessary to denote the cross-border environment in the second mentioned agreement. See
Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into
the Abyss?, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 1023, 1060-61 & nn.257-58 (footnotes omitted) (citing Daniel P.
Cunningham & Paul Michalski, Enforceability Under Various Bankruptcy Laws of the Auto-
matic Termination and Netting Provisions of the ISDA Standard Form Agreements, in
ADVANCED SWAPS AND DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, at 227, 231 (PLI Corp. L. &
Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 746, 1991); see also David Crowling, Cross-Border Insol-
vencies: Building a Framework, AUSTRALIAN ACCT., Aug. 1997, at 48 (“The insolvency com-
munity has begun trying to full the vacuum [concerning insolvency of multinational enterprises]
stepping up their efforts to establish a protocol for resolving issues that arise when companies
with worldwide operations and assets go under.”).
57. See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT; INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW (Tentative Draft 1997). For example, while historically,
the United States sought to extend its strict laws beyond its borders, in recent years it changed
course, and has increased cooperation with other regulators.  See Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and
Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 955-56
(1994) (noting that SEC’s acceptance of comity and cooperation “represents a profound philo-
sophical shift and one that recognizes the globalization of the world’s securities markets”);
Gregory K. Matson, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transnational Securi-
ties Fraud, 79 GEO L. J. 141, 165 n.125 (1990) (noting U.S. agreement with Canada to cooper-
ate in investigation and prosecution of securities fraud and informal agreements with Japan,
Great Britain and France expressing desire to cooperate in investigation of securities fraud).
58. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997).
59. See Securitisation: An International Perspective, supra note 2.
60. See RICHARD E. SPIEDEL, ROBERT S. SUMMERS, & JAMES J. WHITE, SALES AND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS - TEACHING MATERIALS 7 (5th ed. 1993).
61. See Securitisation: An International Perspective, supra note 26.
62. See id. The purpose and form of absorbing other countries’ laws in full or in part differ.
Countries may absorb foreign concepts, or specific laws, or institutions, apply such laws to
classes of people or transactions. Absorption may be driven by a desire to attract foreign actors
who prefer the foreign laws because they are more protective or more familiar, or because such
laws facilitate the country’s economic growth. See Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants:
An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994); ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
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laws rather than accommodate the securitization process63 but have
allowed domestic actors to securitize financial assets by transferring
the assets to offshore centers.64
Organizations like the National Law Center for Inter-American
Free Trade are preparing model forms and laws.65  A 1995 publication
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation described the trend
of securitization stating “the pattern of transference has been for
techniques first perfected in the United States to be introduced in the
euro-markets and thence in other national markets.”66  The Interna-
tional Institute for Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) are working to create uniform rules for cross-border
assignments.67  The United Nations too has established a working
group preparing a law to facilitate securitization.68
While financial merchants are creating model laws, countries and
other organizations are preparing securitization laws that are more
creditor and investor-friendly.  The Organization of American States
is drafting a model law on secured transactions.69  So is the EBRD
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), an institu-
tion70 that helps countries in Eastern Europe to privatize their enter-
prises and in the process securitize their financial assets as well.71
Thus, the law of securitization is being developed in the markets, by
63. See Securitisation: An International Perspective, supra note 26.
64. See id.  This method will not be effective if long-term securitization becomes truly an
accepted intermediation more.  Short-term, until we see where the securitization movement is
going, this attitude can be an effective strategy for some countries.  See id. (suggesting that such
a policy is likely to be most effective if securitization remains confined to the United States and
a few offshore markets, but if it characterizes the markets of many OECD countries, other
changes will be necessary).
65. See National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, Secured Financing (visited
Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.natlaw.com/secfin.htm>.
66. Securitisation: An International Perspective, supra note 24.
67. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group on Inter-
national Contract Practices, supra note 43; Harold Burman, Public International Law, 31 INT’L
LAW. 685 (1997).
68. See U.N. Drafting Trade Rules that Would Aid ABS, ASSET SALES REP., Apr. 28, 1997,
at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; supra note 55 (describing development of
modern international law merchant in area of swaps).
69. See Burman, supra note 67.
70. See Don Wallace, Jr., International Initiatives to Harmonize the Law of Secured Trans-
actions (Bus., Econ., & Regulatory Law Working Paper Series) (forthcoming 1997) (on file
with author).
71. When country laws lack concepts used for securitization such as recognized assignment
of financial assets or trust, the accommodation of securitization may be more problematic.
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communities, and by governments. Even after domestic laws are en-
acted, private innovators continue to innovate. Arguably, the reactive
effect of law merchant on centralized lawmaking optimizes the effi-
ciency of law.
Some countries have enacted specific laws regulating securitiza-
tion.72  The United States did not enact such a law, but legislated to
meet particular problems in the tax, securities regulation and com-
mercial law areas.73  Arguably, this method allows markets to develop
the securitization process, and the government to interfere whenever
a problem arises.  Yet, it lacks uniformity and a cohesive treatment of
the subject.
The process of unification is not necessarily smooth especially on
an international level; problems may stem from the very nature of se-
curitization, the conversion of illiquid financial assets into liquid fi-
nancial assets, and from the different approaches taken by the vari-
ous actors.74
3.  Enforcement of Securitization Law.  Securitization law is
enforced both by government apparatuses and by private parties. In
the international arena, as the reach of government regulators is
72. See Jordan Outlines Emerging Markets, ASSET SALES REP., Apr. 22, 1996, at 6 (noting
that Japan recently passed a law recognizing asset-backed securities and that Chile is in the
process of changing its laws), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws file.
73. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 671, §§ 860A-860G, 100
Stat. 2085, 2308-18 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 860A-860G (West supp. 1998))
(providing pass-through tax treatment to certain mortgage pools); Small Business Job Protec-
tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, sec. 1621, §§ 860H-860L, 110 stat. 1755, 1758-68
(codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 860H-860L (West supp. 1998)) (providing pass-through tax treat-
ment to other financial asset pools); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
§30, 89 Stat. 97, 169-70 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §77d(5) (1994)) (exempting certain mortgage-
backed securities from regulation under the Securities Act of 1933); Secondary Mortgage Mar-
ket Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.) (encouraging participation of private sector in issuance and
secondary markets in mortgage-backed securities); Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §501, 94 Stat. 132, 161-63 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §1735f-7a (1994)) (preempting state laws limiting interest rates on cer-
tain federally related loans); Garn- St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, §341, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505-07 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1701j-3 (1994))
(preempting state laws prohibiting due-on-sale clauses with respect to real property loans).
74. For example, the guiding principles of professions, such as accountants, may not al-
ways be compatible with the business purposes and financial structures of financial institutions.
Securitization may profoundly change asset evaluation of institutions that currently hold liquid
asset backed securities but traditionally held illiquid assets on which these securities are not
based. While the accounting profession prefers market pricing, these institutions object to such
pricing which would render their balance sheets far more volatile. See John Evans, U.K. Bank-
ers Vow to Fight ABSA Accounting Plan, GLOBAL GUARANTY, Sept. 9, 1991, at 1.
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reduced, various forms of private enforcement are playing a greater
role.
One effective form of private self-enforcement appears in deal-
ings among few actors that interact and depend on each other long-
term.75 This relationship fosters trust and reduces the cost of verifying
members’ assertions and promises because, over time, their behavior
becomes more predictable. Interdependence provides self-enforcing
sanctions against violators of this trust. Self-regulatory organizations
perform in a similar fashion, among a larger number of members, and
are especially effective if membership is required in order to practice
a trade or profession or use special benefits that the organization of-
fers.76
Reliable, regulated intermediaries also provide an effective pri-
vate self enforcement, especially for interaction among strangers. In-
termediaries create an “impersonal trust”77 for such strangers—a trust
in the system that the intermediaries would enforce. Intermediaries
have been performing this function for centuries, for example, by
paying on presentation of bills of lading and more recently honoring
credit card charges.78  Similarly, intermediary money managers play a
crucial role in cross-border investments, where investors need trusted
representative most.79  Finally, a semi-private enforcement arises
when parties choose the country forums for their dispute resolutions.
75. See Cooter, supra note 5.
76. See id., at 1688-89 (discussing how norms are made by intermediate institutions; or-
ganizations make rules for  members and create advantages  for them); id. at 1682
(“Specialized business is often organized so that efficient norms emerge from repeated transac-
tions.” If a player cheats on industry norms it will be someone with a short time horizon.); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in A Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Frankel, supra note 5.
77. “Impersonal trust” refers to reliance on third parties, whether fiduciaries, escrows, or
other “guardians” and their monitoring and controls of other parties to a transaction.  Efficient
financial systems are based on trust; that is, reduced verification. However, while personal trust
requires information about the other party to the transaction, impersonal trust relies on inter-
mediaries to reduce the information costs and verification regarding the other party to the
transaction.  For example, international trade is advanced by bank letters of credit, and in the
domestic markets, the ordering of goods by telephone from catalogs with the aid of credit cards
demonstrates “impersonal trust” through the intermediation of banks.  In addition, parties use
legal rules as a substitute for trust in other parties to reduce their monitoring costs.  See Max-
well J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is There a
Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 377 (1993) (citing Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control
of Interpersonal Trust, 93 AM. J. SOC. 623, 634 (1987)).
78. See id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 76).
79. Historically, money managers became important as reliable when investors sought at-
tractive investments abroad but needed reliable people to select and manage these invest-
ments.  See 3 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 2 (1980).
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However, these private enforcers may be unable to cope with the
growing number of actors.  Hopefully, in time, domestic legal systems
and the community of international intermediaries will absorb the
modern international “law merchant.”
IV. CONCLUSION: LEGAL CHANGE
Maintaining existing law, on the one hand, and changing the law,
on the other hand, involve costs and benefits. As compared to the
status quo, change is costly in terms of learning and adaptation, and
greater uncertainty.80 However, as new problems arise and the envi-
ronment changes, existing laws must respond and adapt. For exam-
ple, securitization was invented to address problems caused by a
transformed environment that existing institutions failed to solve.
Cross-border securitization was invented to address problems caused
by existing legal and business environments that failed to accommo-
date the securitization process.
There is an on-going tension between maintaining existing laws
and changing them. In principle, an efficient change is that in which
net gains from new arrangements exceed net gains from existing ar-
rangements, which the new may destroy. Such a calculation, even if
possible, is outside the scope of this Article.
Law can be changed by central lawmakers, such as government,
and acquire the force of law upon passage.  Law can be changed by
markets—piecemeal and incrementally—and acquire the force of le-
gal custom upon substantial following or adoption by central law-
makers.  Cross-border securitization law starts in market lawmaking,
which seems appropriate.  Introducing a new financial process in a
volatile environment requires experimentation, and substantial fol-
lowing.  Markets offer more freedom from institutional constraints
and require at the outset fewer risk-takers and lower consensus.81
Lawmaking markets produce a greater variety of responses to prob-
lems, and limit the adverse effect of unsuccessful experiments.82
Private sector actors have incentives to both innovate and stan-
dardize the law.  Securitization, domestic and cross-border, offer in-
80. See, e.g., JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 88 (1st ed. 1939).
81. See Cooter, supra note 5, at 1666 (“[A] consensus will arise in the community about
how agents ought to act. Such a consensus will convince some members of the community to
internalize the norm. . . .); id. at 1664 (“[I]nternalization of norms is the ultimate decentraliza-
tion of law.”).
82. In fact, some of the arguments against federalizing corporate and commercial laws and
for vesting in the states the residual powers to make such laws are based on similar grounds.
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centives for these actors to innovate.  The subject matter of the law is
sufficiently complex, so that numerous other actors find it less costly
to resort to the innovators rather than learn the area and master the
innovation.  Also, the dollar amounts involved in the innovative
transactions are sufficiently large to cover the innovators’ develop-
ment costs.  These rewards are generally higher than licensing fees
from trademark, copyright and patent protections.  Therefore, in se-
curitization and similar cases lawmaking develops in decentralized
markets.
If these conditions are not met, innovative lawmaking is likely to
develop by a central authority, such as a government or a large pri-
vate sector corporation, and market law is likely to follow.  However,
in both cases market and central lawmaking complement each other.
Standards follow unique innovations.  Private sector innovators take
active part in introducing standards that culminate in rules, and coun-
tries pass laws that accommodate securitization (by special laws ad-
dressing the process or by adjusting existing laws that hinder the de-
velopment of securitization).  This process has the earmarks of the
common law “muddling-through,”83 experimenting, adapting, and
adjusting.  Uniformity, however, is close by.
It is unlikely that the law of cross-border securitization will be
enacted and enforced by a central international lawmaker any time
soon, even though calls for such an institution have been heard.84 In-
stead, uniformity in international norms will probably emerge
through mechanisms such as the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, cooperating governments and regulators,85 regional
markets seeking a more homogeneous institutional and legal infra-
structure,86 bodies developing principles and models of law,87 and pri-
83. See, e.g., the Italian experience codifying and defining insider trading as compared to
the American experience. See Eugenio Ruggiero, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy, 22
BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 157 (1996) (demonstrating an ineffective codification).
84. See, e.g., John H. Chun, Annual Survey Issue: International Insolvencies: Note “Post-
Modern” Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need An International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2647 (1996); Peter E. Millspaugh, Global Securities Trading: The Question
of a Watchdog, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 355 (1992).
85. See Rochael M. Soper, Other International Issues: Promoting Confidence and Stability
in Financial Markets: Capitalizing on the Downfall of Barings, 7 DUKE COMP. & INT’L L. 651
(1997); Charles A. Samuelson, The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal Oversight of Derivative
Transactions in the United States, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 767 (1996) (posing the issue of regula-
tion transfer from states to international arena).
86. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, The Case of Financial Services, 12 J. INT’L L. BUS. 124
(1991).
87. See, e.g., Maria A. Volarich, Note: Easing the Regulation of a Pan-European Securities
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vate agreements feeding customary laws that, like precedents, gain
coercive momentum as they are replicated over time.  Cross-border
securitization is indeed without law in the traditional sense, but it is
not lawless.
Market: Applying the Recommendation of the Rudman Report to EASDAQ, 19 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 2230 (1996).
